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Modeling Deception In Information Security As A Hypergame - A Primer

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PROBLEM

In order to use deception as a viable information security defensive mechanism, one must properly analyze the conflict at hand. There is little work that analyzes the use of deception as a strategic defensive mechanism in computing systems. A hypergame is a game-theoretic conflict model where players may have misconceptions of assets, actions, and preferences of other players. We demonstrate that hypergames may provide strategic insights in designing deception into security

Insider Threat Conflict Admin's Perceived game Perceived Equilibrium Perceived Equilibriums Conflict Equilibrium Actions Maintenance Hypergame Security Admin Bait Investigate Insider Work # Exfiltrate

PURDUE



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